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INTRODUCTION
Even before the Supreme Court's landmark decisions in Massiah v.
United States,1 Escobedo v. Illinois,2 and Miranda v. Arizona,3 the New
York Court of Appeals recognized that an accused person needs the pro-
tective assistance of an attorney prior to the beginning of his trial, not
merely during it.' In its 1960 People v. Di Biasi opinion, the Court of
Appeals abandoned the prevailing federal court notion5 that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, standing alone, offered
adequate protection against convictions based on confessions illicitly ob-
tained from suspects.6 In contrast, the Di Biasi court focused on the co-
erced confession problem by broadening the scope of an accused's right
1. 377 U.S. 201 (1964). Massiah was the first case in which a majority of the Supreme Court
recognized that the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment extended to pre-trial en-
counters between defendants and police, and that violations of that right would give rise to exclusion
of evidence obtained during counsel's absence. Id. at 206. Prior to Massiah, the Court chose to
evaluate such encounters only in terms of whether the police used coercion to obtain evidence, cspe-
cially incriminating statements, from defendants. See infra text accompanying note 41.
2. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). The Court had determined in the Massiah decision that a defendant has
a right to counsel following his indictment. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 205-06. In Escobedo, the court
broadened this protection to any situation where "the investigation is no longer a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect .... " Escobedo, 378 U.S. at
491.
3. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In Miranda, the Supreme Court implemented procedural safeguards to
protect a suspect's privilege against self-incrimination. Miranda requires that prior to questioning a
suspect, police must inform the individual that (a) he has the right to remain silent, that anything the
suspect says can be used against him in court; and (b) that he has the right to have an attorney
present, and if he cannot afford one, an attorney will be provided for him. Id. at 444.
4. People v. Di Biasi, 166 N.E.2d 825 (N.Y. 1960). The DiBiasi court found that the question-
ing of an indicted defendant by the prosecution in the absence of defense counsel "was a violation of
[a] defendant's constitutional rights and that the admission in evidence, over objection, of his admis-
sions made during that questioning after indictment and surrender for arraignment was so gross an
error as to require reversal .... " Id. at 828. Although the DiBiasi court did not articulate which of
Di Biasi's constitutional guarantees had been violated, the majority relied upon dissenting opinions
from the Supreme Court decision in Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959), which advocated the
recognition of a defendant's right to counsel prior to trial. See infra note 7 and accompanying text.
In so doing, the Di Biasi court articulated a constitutional right that the majority of the Supreme
Court did not recognize until 1964 when Massiah was decided.
5. Peter J. Galie, State Constitutional Guarantees and Protection of Defendant's Right' The
Case of New York, 1960-1978, 28 Burs. L. Rnv. 157, 179 (1979). See also infra note 41 and accom-
panying text.
6. Di Biasi, 166 N.E.2d at 827-28. Di Biasi had made incriminating statements to the police
during a custodial interrogation that took place after he was indicted. The Di Biasi court chose not
to examine the "totality of the circumstances" to determine whether the statements were voluntarily
given (as the U.S. Supreme Court would have done at the time, see Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S.
534 (1961); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960)), but rather chose to reverse Di Biasi's
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to counsel, which previously had been held sacrosanct only once the trial
had begun.7 Affording a suspect the right to have his or her attorney
present during custodial interrogation was seen by the court as the most
effective means of insuring that an accused would not knuckle under the
coercive power of the State.' Di Basi sent a direct message to police and
trial courts concerning the permissible limits of obtaining statements. It
took four more years for the U.S. Supreme Court to enunciate such a
bright-line rule.9
The New York Court of Appeals' progressive recognition of the pre-
trial right to counsel, and its later trend of incrementally broadening its
construction of Article I, Section 6 of the New York Constitution,10
earned the Court of Appeals the reputation of being a greater protector
of the rights of criminally accused persons than any other state appellate
court in the nation. I  For three decades, the highest court of New York
exceeded federal court standards for gauging Fifth and Sixth amendment
rights, 2 basing its decisions on the Federal Constitution,' a its state coun-
conviction on the grounds that he had been denied the assistance of his attorney during an interroga-
tion which took place following his indictment. Di Biasi, 166 N.E.2d at 828.
7. People v. Spano, 150 N.E.2d 226 (N.C. 1958), rev'd, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) While the majority
opinion in People v. Spano stands for the proposition that the absolute right to counsel does not
attach before trial, it is ironic to note that the rationale for holding that the right to counsel attaches
at a critical stage prior to trial arose from its appeal to the Supreme Court in the concurring opin-
ions. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 324, 326 (1959) (Douglas, Black, Brennan, and Stewart, JJ.,
concurring).
8. Di Biasi, 166 N.E.2d at 828. In People v. Settles, the court pointed out that,
[l]n this State, the right of a criminal defendant to interpose an attorney between himself
and the sometimes awesome power of the sovereign has long been a cherished principle.
As early as 1777 (N.Y. Const. of 1777, art. XXXIV), it had been recognized that even
the most intelligent and educated layman lacks the skill and knowledge of the legal
system to adequately prepare a defense ....
People v. Settles, 385 N.E.2d 612, 614 (N.Y. 1978).
9. Massiah, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
10. Independent of the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 6 of the New York State
Constitution guarantees the right to counsel in criminal proceedings. It provides in relevant part:
"In any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in
person and with counsel as in civil actions .. " N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
11. Debra M. Zverins, The Expanding Right to Counsel in New York, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
351, 351-52 (1982).
12. People v. Di Biasi, 166 N.E.2d 825 (N.Y. 1960). In Di Biasi, the court went beyond
Supreme Court mandates, holding that the right to counsel attaches when formal proceedings are
commenced, not just at trial. 166 N.E.2d at 828. It has been widely recognized that a particular
state may require more stringent constitutional protections than the Supreme Court mandates. See,
eg., Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 728 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("It is peculiarly within the
competence of the highest court of a State to determine that in its jurisdiction the police should be
subject to more stringent rules than are required as a federal constitutional minimum.").
13. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that no person "[s]hall
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terpart, 14 and New York common law. 5 However, a gloomy shadow of
doubt was cast upon the New York Court of Appeals' long-standing de-
fendant-oriented posture during its 1990 "July decision days."16
According to many authors 7 and judges," New York's progressive
right to counsel reached its pinnacle in the 1981 decision of People v.
Bartolomeo. 9 On May 27, 1978, Bartolomeo was arrested by officers of
the Suffolk County Police Department and arraigned on a charge of ar-
son. He was represented by an attorney at the arraignment, who ar-
ranged for Bartolomeo to be released on bail.20 Thereafter, on June 5,
1978, he was apprehended by officers of the same department and ques-
tioned about his suspected involvement in a murder that was then under
investigation.21 Although the police knew about Bartolomeo's May 27
arrest, they claimed no knowledge that he was represented on that
charge, and neither the police nor Bartolomeo made any effort to contact
his attorney.22 Bartolomeo waived his right to have his attorney present
during the interrogation and made several statements which implicated
himself in the murder.23 In ordering exclusion of Bartolomeo's confes-
sion, the Court of Appeals held that if a criminal defendant is repre-
sented by counsel on a prior pending charge, the police are precluded
from interrogating him on the new charge unless his attorney is present,
and he can only waive his right to counsel if his attorney is present. 24
Bartolomeo also placed an affirmative duty upon the interrogating officers
be compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself," U.S. CONST. amend. V, and the
Sixth Amendment guarantees the criminal defendant the right to "have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
14. See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
15. See eg. People ex rel. Kenny v. Adams, 54 N.E.2d 10 (N.Y. 1944); People ex rel Ferguson
v. Reardon, 90 N.E. 829 (N.Y. 1910).
16. Traditionally, the Court of Appeals attempts to issue opinions in all cases which have been
argued earlier in the year in July. N.Y. LJ., Aug. 28, 1990, at 3.
17. See, eg., Zverins, supra note 11, at 365: "This decision [Bartolomeo] represents the broadest
interpretation of the pre-trial right to counsel in the progression of New York case law in this area."
18. People v. Bing, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 1019 n.2, 1021 (N.Y. 1990).
19. 423 N.E.2d 371 (N.Y. 1981), overruled by People v. Bing, 558 N.E.2d 1011 (N.Y. 1990).
Bartolomeo placed an affirmative duty upon police officers to inquire whether defendant was repre-
sented by an attorney, and thus extended the duty imposed by Rogers by making the police charge-
able with what a reasonable inquiry would have disclosed. See infra notes 163-78 and accompanying
text.




24. Id. at 374-75.
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to discover if the suspect was represented on a prior pending charge.25
The July 2, 1990, decision of the Court of Appeals in People v. Bing,26
however, abandoned the far-reaching mandate of Bartolomeo" and may
have marked the beginning of the end for a thirty-year-old tradition in
New York criminal procedure law.
This Note critiques the analysis of the recent Bing decision, showing
that Bartolomeo was not an unjustified departure from precedent as the
Bing court explained,28 but rather a reasoned application of then-existing
law and a logical progression from the prior caselaw which the Bing
court professes to have left untouched.29 Since in the areas of Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, no state court may ulti-
mately "sink any lower" than the Supreme Court will permit,30 the dis-
cussion will begin by outlining the current federal Sixth Amendment
right to counsel and the debates relevant to that inquiry.3 After tracing
the development of New York law which led up to Bing, this Note argues
that the Bing opinion is either a mistake, perhaps a result of pressure
placed on the court from increased crime rates and the war on drugs,32 or
a masquerade which cloaks a substantial change in the New York court's
25. Id.
26. 558 N.E.2d 1011 (N.Y. 1990).
27. The Bing court expressly overruled Bartolomeo, claiming that the earlier ruling was un-
workable and created "an unacceptable obstruction to law enforcement .... ." Id. at 1014, 1020.
28. Id. at 1022.
29. Id.
30. While state courts are permitted to provide criminal defendants with greater protection than
guaranteed by federal law, see generally Galie, supra note 5, defendants in state prosecutions are
guaranteed at least those protections recognized by the Supreme Court under the United States
Constitution. Federal constitutional guarantees are incorporated through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and thus apply to state action. Michael E. Lubowitz, Note, The Right to Counsel & Choice
After Wheat v. United States: Whose Choice is it?, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 437, 440 (1991). See eg.,
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (Fourth Amendment violations found to give rise to exclusion of
evidence in state courts, as well as federal, by way of incorporation of Fourth Amendment into the
Fourteenth).
31. This analysis focuses upon federal Sixth Amendment guarantees because Article I, Section 6
of the New York Constitution, upon which the New York cases cited herein are based, is analogous
to the Sixth Amendment. See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 (1992); U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
32. Throughout the Bing opinion, the court indicates that the Bartolomeo decision upset the
balance between a criminal defendant's rights and the State's interest in efficient law enforcement by
"impos[ing] an unacceptable burden upon law enforcement." Bing, 558 N.E.2d at 1014. The Bing
court noted that in "decisions after Bartolomeo," it had made efforts to "balance the benefits of
evenhanded administration of the criminal law with the cost the rule exacted from effective law
enforcement." Id. at 1017. See Abraham Abramovsky, The Right to Counsel: Part III, N.Y. L.J.,
Nov. 14, 1990, at 3 (the author characterizes the overruling of Bartolomeo as the court's response to
increased drug use and violence in society).
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political posture33 and abandons principles of stare decisis and institu-
tional integrity.34 Bing distorts precedent 35 and characterizes previously
recognized fundamental state constitutional rights as "unworkable" pro-
cedures.36 By failing to clearly define its parameters, the decision has left
New York right-to-counsel law in a state of flux. It is likely that Bing
marks the prelude of a general change in the Court of Appeals' orienta-
tion toward criminal defendants.
I. BING's BACKDROP: THE FEDERAL CONTEXT
A. Constitutional Admissibility of Statements Evidence
The Supreme Court for many years has refused to base criminal
convictions upon incriminating statements extracted involuntarily from
defendants.3" Such "coerced confessions" traditionally have been ex-
cluded from trial because they are inherently unreliable and their use
violates fundamental concepts of fairness and judicial integrity.38 It was
not until 1964, however, that the Warren Court began enunciating
bright-line rules based on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, 39 and
later on the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination,' °
which would govern custodial interrogations. Prior to this extension of
the Sixth Amendment right to pre-trial questioning, the Supreme Court
relied on the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process "coerced confession"
doctrine4' to exclude statements which were impermissibly obtained.
This doctrine called upon appellate courts to reexamine the facts of indi-
vidual cases to determine whether a given defendant's statements should
have been admitted at his trial.42 Under this doctrine, appellate courts
would sit in de novo review of the trial court's decision to determine if, as
a matter of law, (a) the confession in question was voluntarily given, and
33. In her dissent, Judge Kaye argued "[tihat there are now four votes for those same [policy
considerations rejected by the Bartolomeo court] is, of course, not a valid reason to overrule the
case." Bing, 558 N.E.2d at 1028.
34. See infra Part III.D.
35. See infra Part III.D.
36. Bing, 558 N.E.2d at 1022.
37. Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897) (holding that confessions obtained through
threats or promises could not be used against a defendant at trial).
38. YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 422-25 (7th ed. 1990).
39. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (suppressing defendant's confession obtained in
violation of his right to counsel during interrogation).
40. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding a custodial interrogation conducted with-
out advising a suspect of his Fifth Amendment rights renders the confession inadmissible).
41. See YALE KAMisAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 524-25 (6th ed. 1986).
42. See, eg., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
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(b) whether the police behavior was inherently coercive.' If a defendant
made inculpatory statements under circumstances which showed coer-
civeness or generally indicated that the statements were not voluntarily
given, those infected statements would be excluded from his trial.44
Although in the context of police interrogations the Court recognized the
importance of counsel's presence as a safeguard against police and
prosecutorial overreaching, whether counsel was present during an inter-
rogation still was merely a factor in the "totality of the circumstances"
surrounding a confession.45 The "voluntariness" test was inadequate as a
standard governing the admissibility of statements evidence because: (1)
the test required appellate review of countless cases;' (2) "voluntariness"
proved to be a vague and elusive concept;47 and (3) it provided little gui-
dance to police and trial courts concerning the permissible limits of ques-
tioning.48 The Court attempted to correct these problems, at least in
federal prosecutions, by highlighting factors which would raise a pre-
sumption of involuntariness. In McNabb v. United States,49 and in Mal-
lory v. United States,5" the Court held that long periods of detention prior
to arraignment were grounds for excluding statements obtained during
the detention. These holdings were not the kind of "bright-line rule"
which many scholars argued was necessary to ensure proper police con-
43. Martin R. Gardner, The Emerging Good Faith Exception to the Miranda Rule -A Critique,
35 HASTINGS L.. 429, 445-46 (1984). See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). In Brown, a
case of first impression involving the issue of a State coerced confession, the defendants had been
badly beaten and were forced to sign the confessions that the police dictated to them. Id. at 281-82.
See also Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (defendant's confession rendered inadmissible
where police behavior other than physical brutality was found to be unduly coercive). The rationale
for exclusion in such cases was twofold: (a) such coercion runs counter to fundamental ideas of
justice, id. at 154-55; Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320 (1959); and (o) such coercion increases
the likelihood that the evidence will be unreliable. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 496-97 (1976)
(Burger, CJ., concurring).
44. See Brown, 297 U.S. at 266. The court stated, "[i]t would be difficult to conceive of methods
more revolting to the sense ofjustice than those taken to procure the confessions of these petitioners,
and the use of the confessions thus obtained as the basis for conviction and sentence was a clear
denial of due process." Id.
45. KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 41, at 525.
46. See KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 38, at 427.
47. See id. at 425-28. See also YALE KAMISAR, What is an "Involuntary" Confession? in PO-
LICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 1-26 (1980).
48. KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 38, at 426.
49. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) (holding superseded by statute in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501 (1982)).
50. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957) (holding superseded by statute in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501 (1982)).
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duct.51 To achieve that goal, the proper solution seemed to be the gui-
dance and watchful eye of the defendant's attorney.
The evolution to a Sixth Amendment-based pre-trial right to coun-
sel emerged in a series of cases beginning in 1958 with Crooker v. Califor-
nia. 2 Crooker, who was a law student and fully understood his right to
remain silent during interrogation, confessed to the murder of his lover.
During the interrogation, he demanded, and was refused, an opportunity
to speak with his lawyer.5 3 Although conceding that his confession was
voluntary under traditional Due Process standards, Crooker contended
that the failure of the police to allow him to confer with his attorney, and
to cease questioning him after he made the request was a violation of his
Due Process right to legal representation. The majority in Crooker sum-
marily rejected this argument, finding that such an outcome "would have
[a] devastating effect on the enforcement of criminal law, for it would
effectively preclude police questioning-fair as well as unfair-until the
accused was afforded opportunity to call his attorney.1
54
Justice Douglas's dissent, however, set the stage for the decisions
which would follow. 5 He argued that "[t]he right to have counsel at the
pretrial stage is often necessary to give meaning and protection to the
right to be heard at the trial itself."56 One year later, in Spano v. New
York,57 although still framing the exclusion in Due Process terms, the
Court implied that once a person was formally charged by indictment or
information, his constitutional right to counsel had "begun."5 8 Concur-
ring Justices Douglas and Stewart indicated that the right to counsel af-
ter being charged was part and parcel of the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right; denying the right prior to trial would allow the police
and prosecution to effectively circumvent counsel's assistance at trial.59
In the landmark case of Massiah v. United States,6" the Court finally
recognized a Sixth Amendment right to counsel during interrogation.61
51. See eg., Waiter V. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARv. L. REv. I
(1956).
52. Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958),.overruled by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966).
53. Croaker, 357 U.S. at 434.
54. Id at 441.
55. See KAmisAR ET AL., supra note 41, at 526-27.
56. Croaker, 357 U.S. at 443 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
57. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
58. See id.; KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 41, at 526.
59. Spano, 360 U.S. at 324-27 (Douglas & Stewart, JJ., concurring).
60. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
61. Id. at 205-06.
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Massiah, who had been arrested on federal narcotics charges, retained an
attorney, pled not guilty to the indictment, and was released on bail.62
Colson, a codefendant, had agreed to aid the prosecution in secretly
soliciting incriminating evidence from Massiah.63 Massiah met Colson in
Colson's car and discussed the drug transaction for which the two had
been arrested. Unbeknownst to Massiah, a radio transmitter had been
placed under the seat in Colson's car to allow a nearby agent to listen to
their conversation." Massiah made several incriminating statements
which were later used against him at his trial.65 The Court held that the
district court's failure to exclude these statements was a violation of Mas-
siah's Sixth Amendment right to counsel."
In the same year that Massiah was decided, the Court rendered its
opinion in Escobedo v. Illinois,67 and thereby solidified a concept which
merely had been an assumption6" in Massiah: counsel can play a vital
role in pre-trial interrogation settings.69 Escobedo was taken into cus-
tody for questioning concerning the killing of his brother-in-law. He
made no statements and was released on a writ of habeas corpus secured
by his lawyer." Di Gerlando, who was later charged for involvement in
the murder, made statements implicating Escobedo. 1 Escobedo was
again taken into custody for questioning, but this time he requested to see
his lawyer, who in turn was on the outside demanding to see Escobedo.72
The Court found that this denial of the assistance of counsel warranted
62. Id. at 202.
63. Id. at 202-03.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 203.
66. The Court stated:
[Tihe petitioner was denied the basic protections of that guarantee [of Sixth Amendment
right to counsel] when there was used against him at his trial evidence of his own incrim-
inating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him after he had been
indicted and in the absence of his counsel.
Id. at 206.
67. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
68. See James J. Tomkovicz,4An Adversary System Defense of the Right to CounselAgainst Infor-
mants Truth, Fair Play, and the Massiah Doctrine, 22 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1, 13 (1988).
69. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 484-85. The pre-trial right to counsel is, in part, considered ancillary
to a defendant's right to counsel at trial, since the right to counsel at trial may be greatly devalued if
the government could circumvent Sixth Amendment protections through uncounseled exchanges
prior to trial. See James J. Tomkovicz, The Massiah Right to Exclusion: Constitutional Premises and
Doctrinal Implications, 67 N.C. L. Rav. 751, 754-55 (1989).
70. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 479.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 479-80.
19921
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the suppression of his murder confession.7 3 Although the scope and
meaning of the Escobedo decision was not completely clear, it did articu-
late a Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a "critical stage" prior to
trial.74 Escobedo focused not upon the commencement of formal pro-
ceedings, but on the nature of the investigation and interrogation con-
ducted by the police:
The interrogation here was conducted before petitioner was formally in-
dicted. But in the context of this case, that fact should make no difference.
When petitioner requested, and was denied, an opportunity to consult with
his lawyer, the investigation had ceased to be a general investigation of "an
unsolved crime." Petitioner had become the accused, and the purpose of
the interrogation was to "'et him" to confess his guilt despite his constitu-
tional right not to do so.
The Escobedo decision seemed to break down the distinction between ju-
dicial and extrajudicial settings and extend Sixth Amendment guarantees
to the latter. However, less than two years later, the Miranda Court's
Fifth Amendment "privilege against self-incrimination" overshadowed
Escobedo and left determination of how broad the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel would become for a later generation. 76
73. Id., 378 U.S. at 490-91. In reaching its decision, the Court claimed:
The fact that many confessions are obtained during this period points up its critical
nature as a "stage when legal aid and advice" are surely needed. The right to counsel
would indeed be hollow if it began at a period when few confessions were obtained.
There is necessarily a direct relationship between the importance of a stage to the police
in their quest for a confession and the criticality of that stage to the accused in his need
for legal advice.
Id. at 488 (citations omitted) (quoting Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204 (1963)).
74. KAMIsAR ET AL., supra note 41, at 531-32. Actually, the Escobedo majority focused not
upon the fact that a particular point in the proceeding had been reached, but rather that the investi-
gation had focused upon a single suspect in custody who had demanded to speak with his lawyer.
378 U.S. at 490-91. The "critical stage" referred to was later held to be the commencement of
formal proceedings; i.e., indictment or arraignment. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1972).
Relying on precedent, the Kirby Court reasoned that the "right to counsel attaches only at or after
the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against [the defendant] ... whether by way of
formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment." Id. at 688-89 (citing
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Hamilton v. Ala-
bama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
59 (1963); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218
(1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970)).
75. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 485 (citations omitted) (citing Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 317
(1959)).
76. Tomkovicz, supra note 68, at 14-15. In Miranda the Supreme Court articulated a rule stat-
ing that all criminal defendants in custodial interrogation settings are entitled to have an attorney
present during questioning, and that they must be informed of that fact. Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 471 (1966). This guarantee of counsel had nothing to do with the substantive grant of the
right to counsel in the Sixth Amendment, but was intended as a safeguard against self-incrimination
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It was not until the Court's decision in Brewer v. Williams 77 that
Massiah and Escobedo were revitalized. Defendant Williams was ar-
rested in Davenport, Iowa, in connection with the abduction and disap-
pearance of a ten-year-old girl, 160 miles away in Des Moines.78
Williams had contacted a lawyer in Des Moines who advised him to turn
himself in to the Davenport police.79 Williams' attorney, who had ar-
ranged for the Des Moines police to go to Davenport to retrieve him
after his arraignment in that city, instructed the police that they were not
to interrogate Williams before he had a chance to speak with him, and
advised Williams of the same.80 Despite this warning, the officer who
transported Williams was able to convince him to reveal the location of
the abducted girl's body before they returned to Des Moines.8l The
Supreme Court found his admission inadmissible because, under the cir-
cumstances he had been denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel
after formal judicial proceedings had been commenced against him. 2
The Court's decision in Brewer v. Williams indicated that it was still (or
perhaps once again) willing to recognize a substantive Sixth Amendment
right to counsel prior to trial. Subsequent decisions have upheld the
vigor of the Sixth Amendment Massiah-Escobedo doctrine.8 3
B. Conflicting Rationales
1. Rights of Exclusion vs. Exclusionary Rules. The guarantees of
the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments dictate how states should act
when attempting to obtain a conviction of a criminal defendant.8 4 How-
ever, nothing in those amendments indicates what will happen if the state
to protect Fifth Amendment rights. Most Escobedo questions also fell within the scope of the Mi-
randa rule, and were challenged as Miranda violations because, unlike Escobedo, Miranda gave
"concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow." See id. at
441-42. Although Escobedo and Miranda overlapped with respect to many factual situations, the
nature of the protection each provided was very different.
77. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
78. Id. at 390.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 391.
81. En route from Davenport to Des Moines, Detective Learning delivered his infamous "Chris-
tian burial speech" which convinced Williams (a highly religious man) to take him to the place
where he had left the body. Id. at 392-93.
82. Id. at 397.
83. See ag., Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264
(1980).
84. I narrow the discussion of constitutional guarantees to those which may give rise to eviden-
tiary exclusion of statements: (1) the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unlawful search and
seizure, (2) the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and (3) the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel.
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steps outside of the boundaries the amendments create. There is no rem-
edy articulated in the Constitution for violations of its guarantees.85 In
the context of criminal prosecutions, the Supreme Court has found that
the only plausible means of remedying a violation of a person's Fourth,
Fifth, or Sixth Amendment rights is to exclude evidence obtained in vio-
lation of those rights from his or her trial.86 To use such evidence would
create an unjust distinction between persons accused of crimes and those
not accused of crimes, 7 and would undermine the meaning of those
guarantees.
Evidentiary exclusion is also employed by courts when police or
prosecutors violate court-created "prophylactic rules." Miranda pro-
vides the clearest example of such a rule. 8 Before police may interrogate
a suspect, Miranda requires that they must inform the suspect of his or
her privilege against self-incrimination and the right to have an attorney
present during questioning.8 9 This notice is not a constitutionally pro-
tected right. It is a rule fashioned by the Supreme Court to afford people
a realistic opportunity to exercise their constitutional right to remain si-
lent. Miranda itself does not articulate constitutionally granted rights,
yet evidence obtained in violation of Miranda is also excluded from a
defendant's trialY0
Although not all recognized "constitutional rights" are enumerated
in the United States Constitution, there are certain interests that the
Constitution itself singles out for protection against encroachment.9 1
85. The Fourth Amendment provides in relevant part: "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The Fifth Amendment prohibits compulsory self-incrimination: "nor shall [any person] be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... U.S. CONST. amend. V.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to counsel: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
86. See, eg., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Mapp, a Fourth Amendment case, provides an
excellent example of the rationale behind applying rules of evidentiary exclusion to state court
prosecutions.
87. It is a fundamental principle of our legal system that all defendants are considered innocent
until proven guilty; this implies that we have the same rights as accused citizens that we do as
unaccused citizens. To allow prosecutors to use evidence merely because the State has obtained
control over that evidence (albeit through unlawful means) would seem to create an unjust distinc-
tion between the rights of every citizen and the rights of the accused.
88. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
89. Id. at 444.
90. Id.
91. For example, the Sixth Amendment mandates that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right.., to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONsr.
amend. VI (emphasis added).
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Courts are duty-bound to protect these rights against abridgement.92
Once an interest of any kind has been labelled part of a constitutionally
enumerated right, that interest may not be abrogated unless there is a
proven, compelling government interest.93 In contrast, there are lesser
interests or guarantees which courts also recognize, such as the prophy-
lactic safeguards introduced by Miranda.94 A prophylactic rule is merely
a protection aimed at some narrow goal, usually the indirect protection
of a constitutional right or deterrence of police misconduct, and may be
changed or eliminated by courts as easily as it is created.95 Therefore, for
courts to retreat from the level of protection ensured by prior case law,
they must characterize the protection as something less than a constitu-
tional right (e.g., a prophylactic rule).
The foregoing suggests that two means may be utilized by prosecu-
tion-oriented judges to erode what are truly constitutional guarantees. If
the protection underlying the exclusion is not deemed a constitutional
right, it is quite easy to argue that such an exclusion should not be
granted in a particular case by either attacking the rule itself or by claim-
ing that the rule was not meant to apply to the particular facts of a
case.96 If, however, the protection underlying the exclusion is a constitu-
tionally granted right, it may be attacked by severing the remedy of ex-
clusion from the right itself, and arguing that the exclusion is a court-
created rule intended to serve a goal not relevant to the particular facts of
a case.97 In either case, the formula is the same: (1) characterize the
benefit which the court is denying as a court-created rule rather than a
constitutional right; then (2) argue that either (a) the narrow goals of the
rule would not be served if it were applied to the facts before the court, or
92. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Griswod offers a good discussion of
certain recognized peripheral rights, justified by the Constitution or the Bill of Rights, which fall
within the "penumbras" of particular guarantees enumerated in the Constitution. Id. An example
of a penumbral right is the freedom of association derived from the express First Amendment free-
doms of speech and assembly. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). To the extent that
penumbral rights are related to enumerated rights, the Supreme Court has barred any attempt to
erode them. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-86. By implication, therefore, those rights which are
expressly provided for are offered absolute protection.
93. See, eg., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
94. 384 U.S. at 436.
95. See generally Tomkovicz, supra note 68, at 765.
96. This is precisely the approach taken by the Bing court to strike down the Bartolomeo rule.
The court characterized the Bartolomeo rule as an "unworkable" procedure rather than a substan-
tive right to counsel. People v. Bing, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 1014 (N.Y. 1990). See infra Part III.A.
97. The Supreme Court majority in Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), was forced to use this
approach to limit Sixth Amendment right to counsel protection, since Massiah had labelled the
protection part of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right. See infira text accompanying note 110.
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(b) since the rule itself does not protect the rights it intends to protect, it
is therefore infirm and should be abandoned.
2. Traditional Bases for Excluding Evidence. The underlying ra-
tionale behind exclusion has been a more highly debated topic in Fourth
and Fifth Amendment contexts than in the realm of Sixth Amendment
right to counsel. 98 Since evidentiary exclusion was introduced as a rem-
edy for constitutional violations in the 1914 case of Weeks v. United
States,99 a number of reasons have been advanced for excluding "fruits
from the forbidden tree."'"1° The most compelling reason is that a crimi-
nal defendant has a substantive right not to be convicted at trial based
upon incriminating evidence obtained only by breaching his constitu-
tional rights. 10 1 In other words, the "rights" guaranteed to criminal de-
fendants under the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments 02 implicitly
include the right to have unconstitutionally acquired evidence kept out of
the courtroom.
Another important justification for excluding unlawfully obtained
evidence is the assertion that it is necessary to maintain judicial integ-
rity103 As the Supreme Court recognized in Mapp v. Ohio:
"there is another consideration-the imperative of judicial integrity." The
criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing
can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own
laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence."
The Court has turned to a much less profound rationale in allowing
exclusion, particularly in cases involving exclusion of evidence obtained
in violation of the Fourth Amendment's ban against unreasonable
searches and seizures. In this context, it has justified exclusion by claim-
ing that the "exclusionary rule" deters the police from future transgres-
sions.' 05 Assuming however, as the Court has, that exclusion is only
warranted when the goal of deterrence is served, there may be many de-
fendants who are subjected to egregious infractions of their constitutional
98. See KaisAR ET AL., supra note 41, at 39; Tomkovicz, supra note 68, at 752.
99. 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (Weeks involved a violation of the Fourth Amendment in a federal
prosecution).
100. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963).
101. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398.
102. See supra note 85.
103. The Weeks Court stated that to allow the "tainted" evidence to be admitted at trial would
involve the courts in the commission of a constitutional violation. 232 U.S. at 394.
104. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961) (citation omitted) (quoting Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206, 222 (1959)).
105. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1984).
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guarantees, yet are denied the remedy of exclusion. In Linkletter v.
Walker,"° for example, the Court refused to apply Fourth Amendment
exclusion retroactively to a state prosecution which had arisen before
Fourth Amendment exclusion was first applied to state cases. The court
stated that such use would not serve to deter police from future acts." 7
3. Evidentiary Exclusion under the Sixth Amendment Exclusion
of evidence obtained through violations of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel presents a slightly different situation. The Massiah Court held
that exclusion was necessary as part of the substantive guarantee of coun-
sel, and was not merely a prophylactic safeguard against deprivations of
counsel.'08 Since that time, however, several Justices have argued that
the Fourth Amendment deterrence rationale should be applied to eviden-
tiary exclusion questions in right to counsel cases." 9 This argument,
which undercuts the concept of a Sixth Amendment right to pre-trial
counsel, may have gained preeminence in the 1984 Nix v. Williams deci-
sion. 0 The same Williams who came before the Court in Brewer v. Wil-
liams,III challenged his second conviction which had been obtained
despite the suppression of his incriminating statements." 2 Williams ar-
gued that discovery of the body stemmed directly from the earlier viola-
tion of his Sixth Amendment rights, and that evidence obtained from
that discovery should consequently be excluded. The Court, however,
accepted the prosecution's contention that if the search had continued,
the body inevitably would have been discovered."' The Court main-
tained that it would recognize this inevitable discovery exception to ex-
clusion, provided there was no evidence that the police acted in "bad
faith." 1 4 Nix v. Williams clearly indicates the modem Court's intention
to abandon the Warren Court belief that Massiah and Escobedo repre-
106. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
107. Id. at 637. The Supreme Court also disallowed exclusion when police acted with good faith
belief that a warrant was valid. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
108. Tomkovicz, supra note 69, at 763 (citing Silas Wasserstrom & William J. Mertens, The
Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffol" But Was It a Fair Trial?, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 85, 175 (1984)).
109. See, eg., Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 191 (1985) (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
110. 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
111. 430 U.S. 387 (1977). See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
112. At Williams's second trial, the prosecution was able to submit into evidence (a) the condi-
tion of the child's body as it was when it was found, (b) articles and photographs of her clothing, and
(c) the results of the autopsy and other chemical tests performed on her body. Nix v. Williams, 467
U.S. at 437.
113. Id. at 437-38.
114. Id. at 445-46. This "good faith" exception first arose in the context of Fourth Amendment
exclusion. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
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sented broad constitutionally protected rights to counsel prior to trial.
The Nix v. Williams Court appears to have relegated Sixth Amendment
evidentiary exclusion to the rank of a court created rule rather than part
of a constitutionally enumerated right.
Deterrence as an underlying rationale for exclusion seems misplaced
when one is considering a defendant's right to counsel in an adversary
system of justice. If exclusion, as the remedy attendant to the right to
counsel, is not considered to be an unseverable component of that Sixth
Amendment right, then the right to counsel is meaningless. The Sixth
Amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel contemplates a
contest in which one player has a great advantage in nearly every aspect
of the game.11 In the interests of fairness, justice and pursuit of the
truth, our criminal justice system guarantees defendants the right to the
knowledge, expertise, and savvy of an advocate who will stand up to the
sometimes coercive power of the state.116 Viewing any portion of a de-
fendant's entitlement to an attorney as anything less than a constitution-
ally protected right, therefore, undermines the integrity and effectiveness
of our system of justice. As our focus turns to right-to-counsel law in
New York, there are indications that the Court of Appeals, long revered
as the great protector of defendant's rights, may also be straying down
the wayward path of prophylactic exclusionary rules.
II. NEW YORK'S VERSION OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The Court of Appeals has traditionally shown great reverence for
the right to counsel, viewing it as the only way of maintaining rough
equality between the accused and the law enforcement power of the sov-
ereign.117 So much weight has been given to this right that in many situ-
ations, the court has not accepted purported waivers of the right, unless
they were made while the accused's attorney was present. 1" This protec-
tion acts to insure that such waivers are knowing, intelligent, and
115. See Escobedo, 387 U.S. at 488-90 (recognizing that criminal defendants need the advice and
assistance of counsel to combat the great tactical and procedural advantages held by police and
prosecutors).
116. See People v. Donovan, 193 N.E.2d 628, 629 (N.Y. 1963) ("It would be highly incongru-
ous if our system of justice permitted the district attorney, the lawyer representing the State, to
extract a confession from the accused while his own lawyer, seeking to speak with him, was kept
from him by the police."); Tomkovicz, supra note 68, at 753. See also People v. Di Biasi, 166 N.E.2d
825, 828 (N.Y. 1960).
117. See People v. Cunningham, 400 N.E.2d 360, 363 (N.Y. 1980).
118. See, eg., People v. Donovan, 193 N.E.2d 628 (N.Y. 1963) (holding defendant's written





New York law regarding pre-trial right to counsel has developed
along two distinct lines of cases.12 One line parallels the reasoning of
federal caselaw, holding that once a "critical stage" has been reached in
the proceedings against a criminal defendant, the defendant's right to
counsel attaches."2 The other distinct group of cases holds that once an
attorney has entered the proceeding, the defendant's right to have coun-
sel present during interrogation indelibly attaches, and the defendant
may not intelligently waive his right to counsel unless the attorney is
present at the time the defendant waives the right.122 Elements of both of
these lines of precedent were instrumental to the holding in Bartolomeo,
as is discussed later.
A. Critical Stages Approach
New York first asserted its independent thinking regarding the right
to counsel and privilege against self-incrimination cases in People v. Di
Biasi.123 In that case, the Court of Appeals chose not to follow the then-
prevailing federal "coerced confession" doctrine. 24 Di Biasi, who had
been indicted for first-degree murder, confessed to the police and the Dis-
trict Attorney during an interrogation while his attorney was absent. His
confession was the primary evidence upon which he was later convicted.
The court held that an absolute right to counsel attaches upon indict-
ment and that refusing to allow a defendant to speak to his attorney at
any time after indictment is a violation of his federal and state constitu-
tional right to counsel. 25 This "critical stage" threshold at which the
right to counsel attaches has subsequently been moved to earlier stages in
the criminal proceeding. For example, People v. Meyer' 26 established
that the right attaches at arraignment, and People v. Samuels 27 moved
the critical stage to the filing of a felony complaint. 2 '
119. People v. Hobson, 348 N.E.2d 894, 898 (N.Y. 1976).
120. See generally Abraham Abramovsky, The Right to Counse" Part 1, N.Y.L., Aug. 30,
1990, at 3.
121. See, eg., People v. Di Biasi, 166 N.E.2d 825 (N.Y. 1990).
122. See infra notes 127-39.
123. 166 N.E.2d 825 (N.Y. 1963).
124. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
125. Di Biasi, 166 N.E.2d at 828.
126. 182 N.E.2d 103 (N.Y. 1962).
127. 400 N.E.2d 1344 (N.Y. 1980).
128. See also N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAW §§ 170.10 & 210.15 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1992).




B. The "Once an Attorney" Cases
1. Development of the Doctrine It was not until the Court of Ap-
peals delivered its decision in People v. Donovan 129 that the critical dis-
tinction of New York law emerged. Donovan was taken into custody
because of his suspected involvement in a robbery and murder and was
questioned at length by both the police and the Queens County District
Attorney. 3 ° While Donovan was being questioned, his family retained
an attorney for him. 3' When the attorney went to the police precinct
where Donovan was being held and demanded to see him, the police
refused to allow him an opportunity to even confer with his client.' 32 At
some point later, Donovan confessed to the robbery and murder, and was
subsequently convicted of first-degree murder.'33 The court found that
the New York Constitution,' as well as the New York Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure,' 35 required that Donovan's confession be excluded, even
though he had not yet been formally charged. 136 The Donovan court
held that a confession obtained under circumstances such as these, where
the accused has an attorney and is denied access to that attorney, "con-
travenes the basic dictates of fairness in the conduct of criminal cases and
the fundamental rights of persons charged with crime."' 13 The court's
choice to base Donovan's right to speak to his attorney solely upon the
New York Constitution and laws' 38 proved later to have profound effects
129. 193 N.E.2d 628 (N.Y. 1963).
130. Id. at 629.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 630.
133. Id.
134. See supra note 10.
135. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 170.10 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1992).
136. Donovan, 193 N.E.2d at 629.
137. Id. at 630 (emphasis added) (quoting People v. Waterman, 175 N.E.2d 445, 448 (N.Y.
1961)). Throughout the Donovan opinion, the court reinforces the entitlement to the assistance of
counsel that it is recognizing as a right, including the right not to have confessions obtained "without
the protection afforded by the presence of counsel" used against an accused at trial. Id. (quoting
People v. Waterman, 175 N.E.2d 445, 448 (N.Y. 1961)).
138. The court stated:
Since we have concluded that a confession obtained under the circumstances present
here is inadmissible under New York law, we find it unnecessary to consider whether or
not the Supreme Court of the United States would regard its use a violation of the de-
fendant's rights under the Federal Constitution. In other words, we are of the opinion
that, quite apart from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, this State's
constitutional and statutory provisions pertaining to the privilege against self incrimination
and the right to counsel, not to mention our own guarantee of due process, require the
exclusion of a confession taken from a defendant, during a period of detention, after his
attorney had requested and been denied access to him.
Id. at 629 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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on the development of the right to counsel and the privilege against self-
incrimination in New York. By divorcing its analysis from the con-
straints of U.S. Supreme Court decisions, the Court of Appeals set the
foundation for the expansive right-to-counsel doctrine which emerged
over the next three decades. Even Di Biasi, which showed the progres-
sive tendencies of the high court of New York, did not go so far as to
exclude the U.S. Constitution from the scope of its consideration. Just as
significant, however, was the court's articulation of Donovan's entitle-
ment to the assistance of counsel prior to trial as a right, not merely a
prophylactic rule. As Judge Fuld stated:
Here we condemn continued incommunicado interrogation of an accused
after he or the lawyer retained by him or his family has requested that they
be allowed to confer together. And, it necessarily follows, if such a request
is refused and a confession thereafter obtained, its subsequent use not only
denies the accused the effective assistance of counsel but also... 'contra-
venes the basic dictates of fairness in the conduct of criminal causes and the
fundamental rights of persons charged with crime.
' 13 9
People v. Arthurs" affirmed and extended the Donovan rule, requir-
ing that:
Once an attorney enters the proceeding, the police may not question the
defendant in the absence of counsel unless there is an affirmative waiver, in
the presence of the attorney, of the defendant's right to counsel. There is no
requirement that the attorney or the defendant request the police to respect
this right of the defendant.'
41
Arthur presented an ongoing attorney-client relationship in which Ar-
thur's attorney voluntarily went to the police station and demanded to
see his client after learning of his arrest. 42 After meeting with Arthur,
the attorney told the police that his client was intoxicated and should not
be subjected to further questioning."4 3 After Arthur's lawyer left, how-
ever, the police resumed questioning and obtained a confession.'"
Arthur was decided after the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda
v. Arizona, 4 ' yet the opinion seems to once again identify a distinct doc-
trine of New York law. It indicates that Miranda is a rule of protection
while recognizing that New York caselaw approached the right to confer
139. Id. at 630 (citation omitted).
140. 239 N.E.2d 537 (N.Y. 1968).
141. Id. at 539 (citation omitted).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 538.
144. Id.
145. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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with counsel at an early stage as a substantive right, not merely a prophy-
lactic measure intended to deter police misconduct. 146 The Donovan-Ar-
thur rule, or the "once an attorney" rule,147 greatly expanded a criminal
defendant's pre-trial rights and provided room (in the form of unan-
swered questions) for continued growth. As the Arthur court stated,
"[i]n enunciating the fundamental right of the accused to be represented
by counsel, we painted with broad strokes."
1 48
2. The Road Not Taken. By the time the Supreme Court reached
its decision in Miranda, the New York Court of Appeals had surpassed
the standards of most other states in the areas of right to counsel and
privilege against self-incrimination. 4 9 The volatility of the court's choice
to go out on this constitutional limb was illustrated in a series of three
cases that began with People v. Robles1"' in 1970. In Robles, and then
again in People v. Lopez,"' the court, in contrast to its previous decisions
in Donovan and Arthur, failed to recognize as an indelible right the ac-
cused's right to have an attorney present when he formally waives his
right to counsel. Instead, the court used the old "totality of the circum-
stances" review in each case to determine if the waivers of counsel and
the resulting confessions were voluntarily given.s 2 What Donovan and
Arthur had guaranteed as a right was now seen as a qualified protection
146. Arthur, 239 N.E.2d at 538.
147. Rick B. Antonoff, Prior Representation and the Duty to Inquire: Breaching New York's
"Once-An-Attorney" Rule, 10 CARDOzo L. REv. 259, 262 (1988).
148. Arthur, 239 N.E.2d at 538.
149. See Zverins, supra note 11, at 353.
150. 263 N.E.2d 304 (N.Y. 1970), overruled by People v. Hobson, 348 N.E.2d 894 (N.Y. 1976).
In Robles, the defendant's attorney left the room in the police station where the defendant was being
held, asking an officer to "watch" the defendant. While the attorney was gone, the officer solicited a
confession from Robles. Id. at 304-05. The court held that since there was no evidence that the
confession was not offered voluntarily, it was admissible. Id. at 305. The court tried to get around
Arthur by stating that the rule was inapplicable unless there was evidence "which would indicate an
intention to victimize a defendant or outwit his attorney in order to carry on an inquiry," and "[t]he
assertion that once an attorney appears there can be no effective waiver unless made 'in the presence
of the attorney' is merely a theoretical statement of the rule." Id. at 305. This opinion appears to
have turned the court back to the old federal "voluntariness" standard, and while it did not expressly
overrule Arthur or Donovan, it greatly limited and challenged the application of the "once an attor-
ney" rule.
151. 268 N.E.2d 628 (N.Y. 1971), cerL denied, 404 U.S. 840 (1971), overruled by 348 N.E.2d
894 (N.Y. 1976). In Lopez, the court found a waiver of the defendant's right to counsel was valid,
even though the waiver was obtained after indictment and at a time when the defendant had no
counsel, as long as the waiver was made "knowingly and intelligently." Id. at 628-29. The third
case in this series, People v. Wooden, 290 N.E.2d 436 (N.Y. 1972), cert denied, 410 U.S. 987 (1983),
followed the reasoning of Lopez.
152. Robles, 263 N.E.2d at 305.
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to be applied only in certain situations. 153 This change in semantics is
important because it is precisely the vehicle used later in Bing to erode
the Donovan-Arthur family of rulings. However, the Court of Appeals
overcame this temporary resurgence of the old voluntariness, or "coerced
confession" standard, and set a clear objective for future decisions in Peo-
ple v. Hobson.54
3. Donovan & Arthur Revived. The Hobson court clearly restated
what had been an accepted principle in New York law prior to 1970:
Once a lawyer has entered a criminal proceeding representing a defendant
in connection with criminal charges under investigation, the defendant in
custody may not waive his right to counsel in the absence of the lawyer...
[any statements obtained after an impermissible waiver] are inadmissible.1 55
The police in Hobson knew that the defendant was represented by coun-
sel, yet obtained a written waiver of his right to have his attorney present
during interrogation. 56 The court found that the waiver was invalid,
and that Hobson's statements were consequently inadmissible. 5 7 As in
Donovan, the court articulated and sought to protect the right to counsel
and the privilege against self-incrimination founded in the state constitu-
tion, over and above those required by the U.S. Constitution. 15
While Hobson briefly regained the court's defendant-oriented pos-
ture, there are two alarming elements of this opinion which can be read
to forecast the Bing decision and its potential aftermath. First, while the
court shed the narrow vision of Arthur'59 upon which it had based the
Robles decision, it retained Robles' vision of the right to counsel during
pre-trial custodial interrogation as a prophylactic rule. 16° The second
element is the seeming lack of consensus about the bases underlying the
Hobson decision.' 6' The importance of these points will be discussed
153. Id.
154. 348 N.E.2d 894 (N.Y. 1976).
155. Id. at 896.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 897-98.
159. People v. Arthur, 239 N.E.2d 537 (N.Y. 1968).
160. See supra text accompanying note 152. The Hobson court claimed, "[n]otwithstanding that
warnings alone might suffice to protect the privilege against self incrimination [referring to Miranda
warnings], the presence of counsel is a more effective safeguard against an involuntary waiver of
counsel than a mere written or oral warning in the absence of counsel." 348 N.E.2d at 898.
161. The Hobson majority opinion was written by Chief Judge Breitel, who had dissented from
all three Robles decisions: People v. Robles, 263 N.E.2d 304 (N.Y. 1970); People v. Lopez, 268
N.E.2d 628 (N.Y. 1971); People v. Wooden, 290 N.E.2d 436 (N.Y. 1972). See also supra notes 117-




4. Prior Representation Corollary162 to the "Once an Attorney"
Rule
a. People v. Rogers. Until its 1979 decision in People v. Rogers,163
the Court of Appeals expressly refused to extend the Donovan-Arthur
rule to situations other than where the defendant is questioned by the
police about the specific charges for which he is held. People v. Taylor 164
held that representation on a pending, unrelated charge did not qualify as
counsel "entering the proceeding" for purposes of triggering the Dono-
van-Arthur rule, and therefore in such cases a suspect could waive her
right to counsel in her attorney's absence.165 However, Rogers extended
the Donovan-Arthur ban on uncounseled waivers to include all situations
in which the defendant is represented by an attorney on the charge for
which he was taken into custody, and the police pursue a line of ques-
tioning that is unrelated to the matter for which he secured counsel. 166
Rogers, arrested because of his alleged involvement in a robbery, in-
formed the police that he was represented by an attorney, yet waived his
right to have counsel present during his interrogation.1 67 After extensive
questioning, Rogers' attorney contacted the police and instructed them
to cease questioning him about the robbery. 16 The police then contin-
ued to question Rogers (under a purported waiver of his right to counsel)
about other unrelated incidents. At some point later, the defendant
made a statement which indicated his involvement in the robbery. 169
The Court of Appeals held that Rogers' statement was inadmissible be-
cause his right to counsel had indelibly attached, and he could only have
waived that right if his attorney had been present. 170
Notably, the Rogers court did not limit its decision to the narrow
cating that some of the judges of the court only begrudgingly accepted Breitel's revival of Donovan
and Arthur. See Hobson, 348 N.E.2d at 903-04 (Jasen & Gabrielli, JJ., concurring separately). The
concurring opinion of Judge Gabrielli argued that the court should not overrule People v. Lopez. Id.
at 903 (Gabrielli, J., concurring) (citing People v. Lopez, 268 N.E.2d 628 (1971)). The Lopez court
allowed an uncounseled waiver of the right to counsel in contravention of Donovan and Arthur.
Lopez, 268 N.E.2d at 629. See supra discussion accompanying note 150.
162. Antonoff, supra note 147, at 269.
163. 397 N.E.2d 709 (N.Y. 1979).
164. 266 N.E.2d 630 (N.Y. 1971).
165. Id. See also Hobson, 348 N.E.2d 894.
166. Rogers, 397 N.E.2d at 710-11.
167. Id. at 711.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 713.
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facts before it, as the Bing court claimed, 17 1 but instead expressed an
intent to include all situations in which questioning is unrelated to the
charges for which the suspect is represented. In defining the right to
have the assistance of counsel during custodial interrogation, the Court
of Appeals once again painted with broad strokes. 172 Rogers, therefore,
extended the Donovan-Arthur rule to exactly the situation that People v.
Taylor had excepted-when a defendant is represented on a pending
charge, has been released, and is subsequently apprehended and ques-
tioned on a new charge. 173 The court's choice to expressly overrule Tay-
lor, which excluded from the scope of the Donovan-Arthur rule the
defendant who is represented on a prior unrelated charge, clearly indi-
cates that the Rogers court intended its ruling to encompass the Taylor-
like situation encountered in People v. Bartolomeo.'74
171. The Bing court claimed:
We emphasize in closing that although Rogers and Bartolomeo are frequently linked in
legal literature and Rogers was the only case cited to support the new rule in Bartolomeo,
the two holdings are quite different. In People v. Rogers, the right to counsel had been
invoked on the charges on which defendant was taken into custody and he and his coun-
sel clearly asserted it. To protect his rights, we established a bright-line rule preventing
the police from questioning defendant about those charges or any other charges. In
People v. Bartolomeo, however, defendant was taken into custody for questioning on a
new, unrelated charge. He was not represented on that charge and freely waived his
right to counsel.
558 N.E.2d 1011, 1022 (N.Y. 1990) (citations omitted).
172. Id. In Rogers, as in Arthur, the language of the court creates a very broad grant of the
right to have counsel present during pre-trial procedures and requires the police to comply with the
spirit of the rule, which protects defendants from the "[a]wesome and sometimes coercive power of
the state." Rogers, 397 N.E.2d at 713. In interpreting the precedent upon which it based its rule, the
Rogers court actually states that "[t]he common thread running through these holdings is the simple
fact that defendant was represented by an attorney at the time of the interrogation." Id. The court's
language, therefore, expressly included within the "once an attorney" rule all situations in which the
defendant was, in fact, represented by an attorney. "Once a defendant has an attorney as advocate of
his rights, the attorney's function cannot be negated by the simple expedient of questioning in his
absence." Id.
173. People v. Taylor, 266 N.E.2d 630 (N.Y. 1971), excepted from the scope of the Donovan-
Arthur rule the situation in which questioning was about charges unrelated to the one on which the
defendant was represented. The Rogers court stated, however:
We today recognize that the Taylor rule is inconsistent with the principles enunciated in
Hobson and declare that once a defendant is represented by an attorney, the police may
not elicit from him any statements, except those necessary for processing or his physical
needs. Nor may they seek a waiver of this right, except in the presence of counsel.
Rogers, 397 N.E.2d at 713.
Concerning the issue of whether the parameters of questioning are, in fact, unrelated to the prior
pending charge for which the suspect is being represented, the court argued that "it is the role of the
defendant's attorney, not the State, to determine whether a particular matter will or will not touch
upon the extant charge." Id.
174. 423 N.E.2d 371 (N.Y. 1981).
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The Rogers decision was problematic, however. Rogers held that
requiring a suspect's attorney to be present when the suspect waives his
right to counsel is part of a criminal defendant's fundamental right to
representation, and not just a prophylactic rule to help protect a suspect
from incriminating himself.175  Although this reasoning is consistent
with the Donovan and Arthur opinions, 176 the facts of Rogers extended
the Donovan-Arthur rule far beyond what had been previously recog-
nized. Such an extension of the right to counsel left many questions con-
cerning its implementation. 177 A major concern left unanswered by the
decision was how great a duty, if any, would be placed upon police to
determine if the suspect is represented by counsel.1
7
b. People v. Bartolomeo. People v. Bartolomeo 179 was the inevita-
ble challenge to the parameters of the Rogers decision which the court
had, up to that point, managed to forestall. 8 Defendant Bartolomeo
was arrested by the Suffolk County Police Department, arraigned on an
arson charge for which he obtained counsel, and released on bail.' He
was subsequently arrested by officers of the same law enforcement agency
as a suspect in a homicide case. At the time of the interrogation,
Bartolomeo did not inform police that he had obtained an attorney for
the prior charge, and the police did not claim any knowledge of the rep-
175. Rogers, 397 N.E.2d at 713.
176. See supra text accompanying note 152.
177. Rogers failed to specify exactly under what circumstances the court would find purported
waivers ineffectual and how far the police were duty-bound to go in determining (a) if the suspect
had any prior charges pending against him, and (b) if, in fact, he was represented by counsel on such
pending charges. See Rogers, 397 N.E.2d at 713. For a period of time, enforcement of Rogers was
largely hit-or-miss. Compare People v. Kazmarick, 420 N.E.2d 45 (N.Y. 1981) (holding admissible
a confession obtained from a murder suspect who was previously arraigned without representation
on a charge of shoplifting) with People v. Cunningham, 400 N.E.2d 360 (N.Y. 1980) (holding that an
uncounseled waiver of a constitutional right is invalid if made after a defendant requests counsel),
178. The Kazmarick court stated:
We do not find it necessary on the present record to determine whether or under what
circumstances knowledge, actual or constructive, by the police of a pending unrelated
charge against defendant will be sufficient to put them on notice that defendant is in fact
represented by counsel on that charge and, therefore may not be interrogated on the new
matter, absent waiver of counsel in the presence of counsel.
420 N.E.2d at 49. The court did note, however, that "proximity in time and geographical location,"
as well as the "seriousness of the pending unrelated charge," would be important factors. Id. at 49
n.3.
179. See supra note 19.
180. The court had refused to decide upon the issue in Bartolomeo in earlier cases. See, e.g.,
Kazmarick, 420 N.E.2d at 49.
181. People v. Bartolomeo, 423 N.E.2d 371, 374 (N.Y. 1981).
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resentation. 182 The defendant waived his right to have an attorney pres-
ent, and made inculpatory statements about the murder."8 3
The Bartolomeo court recognized that the Rogers rule applied to sit-
uations in which the defendant is represented by counsel on prior unre-
lated charges. The court saw Bartolomeo as nothing more than the
logical outcome of Rogers, especially in light of its decision only months
before in People v. Miller,"8 4 which encountered a factual situation with
elements of both Rogers and Bartolomeo.'85 Bartolomeo also placed an
affirmative duty upon investigating police officers aware of prior charges
against a suspect to conduct a reasonable inquiry to determine whether
the suspect was in fact represented by counsel.
Having failed to make such inquiry, the officers were chargeable with what
such an inquiry would have disclosed-namely, that defendant did have an
attorney acting on his behalf. With such knowledge they were foreclosed
either from questioning defendant or from accepting his waiver of counsel's
assistance unless his attorney was then present.
18 6
If the defendant had no attorney representing him on the prior charge,
then the defendant's waiver of his right to counsel without counsel's pres-
ence was valid. If the defendant had secured counsel for the prior
charge, and the police failed to have the attorney present before soliciting
a waiver from the defendant, then the waiver was invalid (and attendant
incriminating statements would be inadmissible).18 7 Just as the Rogers
court had failed to do, however, the Bartolomeo court did not clearly
define the parameters of its holding, leaving questions such as whether
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. 425 N.E.2d 879 (N.Y. 1981).
185. In Miller, the defendant was suspected in a 1977 Rockland County rape. The District
Attorney had sought, and the village court had denied, an order to have Miller appear in a corporeal
lineup in connection with the rape. Miller was represented on this matter. In August 1978, Miller
was arrested on a charge of criminal possession of stolen property for the theft of a car. The police
also suspected him of the rape of a second woman, which had allegedly taken place in the stolen car.
Id. at 880-81. Miller was not represented during questioning on these most recent matters, and
during the interrogation he made incriminating statements about all three crimes. Id. at 880-81.
The court held that Miller's statements had been improperly admitted at trial: (a) regarding the
stolen property charge, because his right to counsel had indelibly attached since he had already been
arraigned (i.e., waiver in absence of counsel impermissible); (b) concerning the 1977 rape, because
the police were aware that Miller had been represented on that charge before; and (c) regarding the
1978 rape, because the post-arraignment interrogation was an integrated whole, in which the matters
were so interrelated as to make them inseparable. Id at 881. "Moreover, as defendant was known
to be represented by counsel in connection with the [1977] rape charge, questioning on other matters
was precluded." Miller, 425 N.E.2d at 881.
186. Bartolomeo, 423 N.E.2d at 375.
187. Id. at 371-75.
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the right would be recognized when a prior charge is pending in a juris-
diction outside of New York.
From 1981 until 1990, when Bing was decided, several exceptions
were carved out of the Bartolomeo rule by the Court of Appeals. l"8
Although these decisions served to limit the scope of Bartolomeo, they
kept the central focus of the rule intact: that if police know, or reason-
ably could of prior pending charges against a suspect, they are duty
bound to determine whether the defendant was represented on the pend-
ing charge before seeking an uncounseled waiver of his constitutional
right to the assistance of his attorney.18 9
III. THE MASQUERADE: PEOPLE v BING
A. The Case
People v. Bing"0 was a consolidation of three separate appeals that
all presented Bartolomeo questions. Defendant Bing, who was suspected
of a New York burglary, was arrested in New York by Nassau County
Police on an Ohio warrant obtained through a police teletype. Although
the New York police were aware of the extant charge in Ohio, they made
no attempt to ascertain whether Bing had secured counsel on the Ohio
charge before questioning him about the New York burglary. Despite
the fact that Bing had counsel on the Ohio charge, he waived his right to
counsel and admitted his involvement in the New York crime. 191
In Cawley, the defendant was charged in New York with robbery.
He was released on bail following his arraignment, at which he was rep-
resented by an attorney. 192 He absconded, and was returned to New
York on a bench warrant six months later.1 93 Cawley had effectively
abandoned his prior relationship with his attorney since he had no con-
188. See Antonoff, supra note 147, for a detailed analysis of the exceptions to Bartolomeo cre-
ated by the court. One of the major limitations placed upon the Bartolomeo rule arose in the Court
of Appeals' decision in People v. Lucarno, 460 N.E.2d 1328 (N.Y. 1984). When asked by police
whether he was represented on any prior charges, Lucarno falsely indicated that he was not repre-
sented by an attorney. Id. at 1329. The Court of Appeals decided that the duty imposed upon police
by the Bartolomeo rule required only a "simple inquiry of the defendant." Id. at 1332. Following
Lucarno, therefore, police in New York needed only to elicit information about possible representa-
tion on prior charges from the defendant himself, and were not required to conduct their own in-
quiry into that question. Id.
189. Bartolomeo, 423 N.E.2d at 374.
190. 558 N.E.2d 1011 (N.Y. 1990). The two companion cases were People v. Cawley and Peo-
ple v. Medina. Id
191. Id. at 1012-13.




tact with his lawyer following the arraignment.194 Cawley waived his
Miranda rights and submitted to questioning by a police officer who was
unaware of the prior representation. Cawley confessed to his involve-
ment with new, unrelated criminal conduct including two murders and
another robbery. 195
In Medina, the defendant was taken into custody because the police
suspected him of murdering two of his neighbors. Medina told the police
that he had been "let go" on a prior assault charge for which he had been
represented. 96 The detective concluded that the charges had been dis-
missed, and continued questioning. Medina made statements implicating
himself in the two murders.' 97
The prosecution sought further exceptions to Bartolomeo in Bing
and Cawley'9 and total elimination of the Bartolomeo rule in Medina.'99
The court found that all three appeals presented situations which fell
within the scope of the Bartolomeo rule, and noted that the exceptions
sought by the prosecution would do much more than modify the rule, as
had been done in the past; they would undercut the rule to such a degree
that it would no longer be viable.2" Overlooking the factual distinctions
between these consolidated appeals and Bartolomeo, where the suspect
had been arrested by officers of the same police department on the prior
charge who were well aware of that charge, the court concluded that
Bartolomeo was no longer justified:
The appeals demonstrate graphically the recurring problems we have had
with the Bartolomeo rule. When it is applied to the circumstances in each
case, the result is not only unworkable but it imposes an unacceptable bur-
den on law enforcement. Nor can the results be avoided by modifying or
creating exceptions to the rule without undermining its rationale. We con-
clude, therefore, that a fundamental change is required and, notwithstand-
ing compelling concerns of stare decisis, we hold that People v. Bartolomeo
should be overruled.201
194. Id. at 1019-20.
195. Id. at 1013.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. In Bing, the prosecution sought to have the court recognize a limitation on the Bartolomeo
rule to exclude prior representation outside of the State of New York, and in Cawley the prosecution
sought an exception for when the defendant voluntarily abandons the attorney-client relationship.
Id.
199. Ironically, only in Medina did the prosecution actually call for a reversal of Bartolomeo,
arguing that there are recurring problems warranting its removal. Id.




The court went on to state that Bartolomeo was antithetical to "the
Taylor rule" and an unjustified departure from settled law, thus disre-
garding its People v. Taylor decision which expressly overruled the hold-
ing in Rogers more that two years before the Bartolomeo case.20 2 The
Bing court further criticized the Bartolomeo decision for the lack of clar-
ity with which it announced its rule, claiming that in the nine years since
it had been decided, New York courts had been fraught with uncertainty
regarding its application.2 °3
Bing concluded that Bartolomeo was merely an "unworkable" rule,
and was not part of, or founded upon, any constitutionally granted
right.2' The court further concluded that Bartolomeo was not based on
sound public policy, since it tipped the balance heavily in favor of crimi-
nal suspects.20 5
B. Bartolomeo Gets Thrown out with His Bathwater
One way of reading Bing may be to conclude that the court either
made a mistake, or is beginning to show the signs of pressure from in-
creased crime rates and the war on drugs. The court approached these
cases from the premise that strict application of Bartolomeo would re-
quire exclusion of the incriminating statements in all three cases, and
justice would not be served by overturning these convictions.20 6 The
court further stated that creating exceptions to fit these situations would
undercut Bartolomeo to such a degree as to make it ineffectual.20 7 This
position is faulty, however, because all three factual situations in Bing are
easily distinguishable from Bartolomeo, and therefore do not present the
types of dangers which the Bartolomeo court sought to prevent-the
knowing circumvention of a viable attorney-client relationship by police.
202. Id. at 1015-16.
203. Id. at 1016-17.
204. See id. at 1020-21.
205. Id. at 1014.
206. Id. at 1018.
207. Id. at 1019-20. In Bing, the court claimed that it would be unreasonable not to recognize
representation in Ohio as triggering a Bartolomeo claim, especially since the court would have to
recognize the defendant's right to counsel if defendant had retained his Ohio counsel on the New
York charges. Id. at 1018-19. In Cawley, the court claimed that it would be requiring courts to look
into the quality of the attorney-client relationship to determine ifBartolomeo applied, and this would
be inconsistent with the rule, since the rule is indelible. Id. at 1019-20. The reasoning seems to be
that if the defendant cannot expressly reject counsel without counsel's presence, it is impossible for
the court to determine if he has impliedly done so. Id. at 1020. The reasoning of the court in both
instances is strained and tenuous.
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In effect, the Bing court narrowed the parameters of its inquiry such that
the only possible outcome was to abandon Bartolomeo.
The court seemed determined to stretch the limits of imagination in
order to show that the circumstances of these cases illustrate how "[tlhe
result [of applying Bartolomeo] is not only unworkable but it imposes an
unacceptable burden on law enforcement." 20 The court failed to explain
why it could not limit the scope of the Bartolomeo rule to representation
within New York State or allow an exception for when a defendant had
voluntarily abandoned the attorney-client relationship. Rather, it specu-
lated that the Nassau police (who had arrested Bing) might be con-
fronted with just as great a problem if the fugitive had been from Buffalo
rather than Ohio.209 Even though Bartolomeo had limited the scope of
its inquiry to the particular police jurisdiction in question,210 the Bing
court saw no "[1]ogical reason to proscribe the police conduct if the
pending charge is in New York but permit it if the pending charge is in
Ohio. ' 21 1 The essence of Bartolomeo was to require police who do have
knowledge of a pending charge against a suspect they wish to interrogate
on an unrelated matter to make a reasonable inquiry to determine if, in
fact the defendant is represented by counsel on the prior charge.212 As
for the court's difficulty with accepting the exception advanced in Caw-
ley, where the defendant had effectively released his attorney for the prior
charge,21 3 it would seem that this issue was resolved in the pre-
Bartolomeo decision of People v. Kazmarick.21 4 In Kazmarick, the court
declared that the mere existence of a pending criminal charge to which
the right to counsel had attached was insufficient to preclude waiver in
the absence of an attorney.21 5
208. Id. at 1014.
209. Id. at 1019.
210. People v. Bartolomeo, 423 N.E.2d 371, 374-75 (N.Y. 1990), overruled by People v. Bing,
558 N.E.2d 1011 (N.Y. 1990).
211. Bing, 558 N.E.2d at 1019.
212. Bartolomeo, 423 N.E.2d at 374-75. Even if the court were to reject an out-of-state excep-
tion, the police had knowledge of the charges facing Bing in Ohio, and because of the Court of
Appeals decision in People v. Lucarno, 460 N.E.2d 1328 (N.Y. 1984), the police could have accepted
at face value a direct response from the defendant regarding whether or not he has an attorney on for
the prior charge.
213. In Cawley, on appeal, the People contended that the defendant had voluntarily abandoned
his relationship with his attorney by absconding and breaking offcontact. .Bing, 558 N.E.2d at 1013.
Apparently, the defendant could not remember his attorney's name nor even if "the attorney was a
man or a woman." Id.
214. 420 N.E.2d 45 (N.Y. 1981).
215. Kazmarick, 420 N.E.2d at 48-49. Although the 'prior representation corollary' to the
Donovan-Arthur rule (i.e., the Bartolomeo rule) was not yet recognized when Kazmarick was de-
19921
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C. Right of Exclusion vs. Exclusionary Rule: Bing Tips the Scales
The Bing court sought to characterize Bartolomeo as either an
anomaly in the law or an extension beyond reason in which the
Bartolomeo court had indulged. The court cited the numerous excep-
tions that had been "carved out" of the rule over the preceding nine years
to illustrate the practical difficulties it saw with the rule.216 The court
went on to claim that Bartolomeo could not be justified as a constitu-
tional entitlement or matter of public policy because it is necessary to
"strike a balance between society's need to investigate and prosecute
crime and the right of individuals to be free from... police intimida-
tion." '217 Not since the pre-Di Bias! days has the court articulated this
type of due process test.218 In previous cases interpreting the New York
constitutional grant of the right to counsel, the court based its decisions
on what it saw as an expansive fundamental right under the right to
counsel and privilege against self-incrimination clauses of the New York
Constitution.219 New York's bar of the use of confessions coerced from a
defendant in the absence of his attorney was, up until Bing, a constitu-
tional right of exclusion, not merely a judicial rule of exclusion aimed at
deterring police misconduct. In Bing, the court stated:
mhe [Bartolomeo] decision did not explain why a rule requiring the pres-
ence of counsel to waive one's rights before criminal proceedings have been
instituted, which is well beyond even the most generous reading of the State
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, was necessary.22
0
This language may sound the death knell for New York's broad constitu-
tional grant of the right to counsel in pre-trial proceedings. It goes far
beyond the stated purpose of Bing to remove the Bartolomeo rule. Es-
pousing a much more limited interpretation of the state constitutional
right to counsel than the court has advanced in over thirty years, it
strikes at the very heart of this area of jurisprudence. The decision also
characterizes the exclusion of uncounseled confessions as a sort of pro-
cided, Kazmarick made clear that the Donovan-Arthur family of cases (of which Bartolomeo was a
child) would only apply if a defendant was actually represented by an attorney. Id.
216. People v. Bing, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 1016-18 (N.Y. 1990).
217. Id. at 1020.
218. See eg., People v. Spano, 150 N.E.2d 226 (N.Y. 1958), rev'd, Spano v. New York, 360
U.S. 315 (1959) (holding that a confession would be admitted unless defendant showed evidence
indicating that his confession was not voluntarily given); People v. Mummiani, 180 N.E. 94 (1932)
(finding that extended detention prior to arraignment alone would not render confession involun-
tary). Defendant must illustrate other factors indicating that he did not voluntarily confess. Mum.
miani, 180 N.E. at 95.
219. See supra notes 10 & 139 and accompanying text.
220. Bing, 558 N.E.2d at 1017.
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phylactic rule, solely for the purpose of protecting the privilege against
self-incrimination and deterrence of future transgressions by the police,
rather than as a component of a defendant's constitutional right to the
assistance of counsel.221 The Court of Appeals, once steadfast in its as-
sertion of the right to counsel, appears to be changing sides in the exclu-
sionary debate which is raging in the federal courts.222 In so doing, it
rejects the principles of fairness and judicial integrity that earlier cases




The Bing opinion distorts precedent in order to arrive at its desired
conclusion. The Bartolomeo court rightly saw its opinion as following
naturally from and directly resolved by the Rogers decision,224 and there-
fore offered little justification for its holding. In light of this, the Bing
court's contention that Bartolomeo was "[n]ot firmly grounded on prior
case law' 221 is untenable. As the majority in Bing pointed out, "Rogers
was the only case cited to support the new rule adopted in
Bartolomeo.'' 226 The reason for this is not because Bartolomeo was "bad
law," or merely an extrapolation beyond the scope of its precedent, but
rather that the Rogers opinion can, and was intended to be read to dictate
the outcome in Bartolomeo.227
The Bing court resurrected the Taylor rule22 8 by disregarding the
fact that it had been overruled in Rogers,229 and declaring that Taylor
221. See id. at 1021.
222. See supra Part I.B(1) of this Note for a detailed discussion of the federal court debate
concerning the rationale underlying the Sixth Amendment exclusionary rule.
223. See People v. Donovan, 193 N.E.2d 628, 630 (N.Y. 1963).
224. Rogers concisely stated that if an accused is represented by counsel, even if the scope of the
interrogation was outside of the charges for which the defendant is represented, the police may not
solicit a waiver of the accused's right to an attorney without his attorney being present. People v.
Rogers, 397 N.E.2d 709, 711 (N.Y. 1979). The rationale behind this holding is that in the formula-
tion of a defense in a criminal trial, it is not for the police, or even the accused himself, to determine
exactly what is unrelated to the charges for which the defendant has counsel. Id. at 713.
225. People v. Bing, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 1022 (N.Y. 1990).
226. Id.
227. See supra notes 170-73 and accompanying text.
228. People v. Taylor, 266 N.E.2d 630 (N.Y. 1971). Taylor stood for the proposition that the
"once an attorney" rule of Donovan-Arthur did not extend to situations where the questioning con-
cerned charges unrelated to those for which the accused was represented. Id. at 631.
229. People v. Rogers, 397 N.E.2d 709 (N.Y. 1979). The added irony here is that the Bing
court expressly renounced any claim that it might be undoing the Rogers ruling in any way. Bing,
558 N.E.2d at 1022.
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had only been "modified. '230 In so doing, the court was able to find a
basis in law for abrogating the Bartolomeo rule, which was, in effect, the
antithesis of the dead Taylor rule. The confusion remains, therefore, in
determining exactly "how far" the Bing court intended to go. Its pro-
fessed intentions are to overrule Bartolomeo and reinstate Taylor, but
leave Rogers untouched. However, because Rogers overruled Taylor,231
holding that police may not seek an uncounseled waiver of the right to
counsel and pursue interrogation on "unrelated matters," as Taylor per-
mitted, and provided the exclusive rationale for the decision in
Bartolomeo, the only logical conclusion is that the Bing court has gone
far beyond its stated purpose. The confusion surrounding the scope of
Bing is apparent from the multitude of lower court cases dealing with
Bartolomeo-Bing issues which have been decided since Bing. Some have
interpreted Bing to mean only that the police no longer have a duty to
inquire whether an accused is represented by counsel on a pending
charge, but indicate that if the police do know of the prior representa-
tion, waiver may still be invalid in the absence of counsel.232 While this
understanding of Bing does no harm to Rogers, it is implausible that this
is what was intended by the Bing court, because it is no more than a
modification of the "unworkable" procedures of Bartolomeo. Other
courts, such as the Second Department in People v. McEachern,233 have
found that Bing totally abrogates the "prior representation corollary" to
the "once an attorney" rule.
The Bing decision seems to have been decided independently of its
logic, and is no more than the manifestation of the New York Court of
Appeals' change in attitude regarding its jurisprudence in the areas of
right to counsel and privilege against self-incrimination. This change
may reflect an alteration of political posture of the judges, or may be
responsive to growing pressure for faster, more efficient law enforce-
ment.234 The court seems to manipulate precedent and distort facts in
order to take the first step toward eliminating New York's expansive pre-
trial right to counsel. The central argument presented by the Bing ma-
jority is that Bartolomeo is not justified by social policy. The Bartolomeo
court, however, determined that its holding was justified, and that the
right for Bartolomeo to confer with his attorney before waiving his right
230. Bing, 558 N.E.2d at 1024.
231. Rogers, 397 N.E.2d 709. See cases cited supra note 172 and accompanying discussion.
232. See, e-g., People v. Spellman, 562 N.Y.S.2d 652, 653 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
233. 560 N.Y.S.2d 897 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
234. See supra note 32.
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to counsel was part of his constitutional guarantee of the assistance of
counsel. As concurring Judge Kaye wrote in Bing, "Itjhat there are now
four votes for those same rejected policy considerations is, of course, not
a valid reason to overrule the case, '2 35 for as the court stated in People v.
Hobson:
The ultimate principle is that a court is an institution and not merely a
collection of individuals; just as a higher court commands superiority over a
lower not because it is wiser or better but because it is institutionally higher.
This is what is meant, in part, as the rule of law and not of men.
236
The harm that Bing could bring to the institutional integrity of New
York courts, as well as to the rule of law in this state, was graphically
displayed in People v. Green,237 a Supreme Court, New York County,
decision rendered in October 1991. Green did not present a right to
counsel question, and was factually dissimilar from either Bing or
Bartolomeo, yet presiding Supreme Court Justice James J. Leff used Bing
to threaten anarchy.
Varon Leroy Green was charged with sexually abusing his nine-
year-old daughter. The molestations occurred over a period of nearly
two years, but the prosecution was unable to specify any particular times
when incidents occurred. In People v. Keindl,23 s a case directly on point
with Green, the Court of Appeals had ruled that Criminal Procedure
Law § 200.50(6) requires that each count of an indictment alleging sex-
ual abuse must specify "on or about" what date specific acts of sexual
abuse occurred in order to protect the accused against vague and unsup-
ported allegations.23 9
Justice Left decided to ignore the controlling Keindl rule, however,
arguing that "rigid compliance" with the pleading requirements of the
Criminal Procedure Law under these circumstances would allow the de-
fendant "to receive a benefit for his own conduct." 2' Using Bing as his
sword, Justice Leff asserted that he had the authority to ignore the "stric-
tures of stare decisis" when he believed following precedent would create
"asinine" results.2 4 1 If Bing stands for the proposition that a judge may
alter the law of criminal procedure every time he or she concludes that
235. People v. Bing, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 1028 (N.Y. 1990) (Kaye, J., concurring).
236. 348 N.E.2d 894, 903 (N.Y. 1976).
237. People v. Green, N.Y.LJ., Oct. 31, 1991, at 25 (Sup. Ct. 1991).
238. 502 N.E.2d 577 (N.Y. 1986).
239. Id. at 581.




the results would be unworkable or would be otherwise dissatisfying, the
result is unthinkable.
CONCLUSION
Bing leaves many unanswered questions about the future of the right
to counsel in New York. The language of the Bing opinion certainly
raises cause for alarm, for what was once an absolute right has become a
qualified protection with the potential to be granted or denied, as the
court sees fit. Once judges turn their backs on precedent and degrade
constitutional rights to the level of exclusionary rules, many more con-
victions may result from unlawfully obtained confessions. Courts need
only articulate a reason why the narrow purpose behind the exclusionary
rule would not be served in a particular case in order to deny its relief. If
the Court of Appeals continues this trend of eroding the right to counsel
guaranteed by the state constitution, it may eventually give rise to a fed-
eral Sixth Amendment challenge. Given the uncertainty of Sixth
Amendment exclusion of statements evidence following Nix v. Wil-
liams,242 such a challenge may determine the scope of the Sixth Amend-
ment entitlement. While the full effect of Bing may not yet be realized,
there are strong indications that the decision marks the end of the New
York Court of Appeals' reign as the "great protector" of an accused's
constitutional rights.
242. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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